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The Plan PHILBY

HARRY ST. JOHN PHILBY
Harry St John Philby (father of the spy Kim Philby), was a British soldier and archaeologist, who during the First World War served in the Arab Information Office in Cairo. For a long period, he acted as representative for various British companies in Saudi Arabia and was also an advisor and confidant of King Ibn Saud.
The Plan and Initial Contacts

In May 1939, the British Government brought out its White Paper, which among other things severely curtailed Jewish immigration into Palestine. Jews and many non-Jews criticised and rejected the contents of this White Paper. Philby, however, considered that the British could not, or would not go back on the National Home aspect of their Palestine policy and that it was therefore essential to devise a formula "for spreading the contingent benefits of a suitable settlement of the Palestine issue over every section of the Arab world" and to find an intermediary who was willing and competent to secure general acceptance of such a formula. He felt that the only candidate for this role was Ibn Saud, the ruler of Saudi Arabia.(147)
Philby's plan, which included a considerable transfer of Arabs form Palestine contained three stages. "The whole of Palestine should be left to the Jews. All Arabs displaced therefrom should be resettled elsewhere at the expense of the Jews, who would place a sum of 20 million pounds sterling at the disposal of King Ibn Saud for this purpose. All other Asiatic Arab countries, with the sole exception of Aden, should be formally recognised as completely independent in the proper sense of the term." These arrangements were to be proposed by Britain and America to Ibn Saud, as the principal Arab ruler and guaranteed jointly by both countries.(148) Throughout the course of Philby's efforts, he attached great importance to the part to be played by Britain and America.
The expression "all Arabs displaced therefrom" which was contained in his plan, was spelt out more clearly by Philby in a meeting with various Zionist leaders at the beginning of October. On this, Namier wrote, "Philby's idea was that Western Palestine should be handed over completely to the Jews, clear of Arab population except for a `Vatican City' in the old city of Jerusalem."(149)
[Lewis Namier was an English historian and Zionist who had served as political secretary to the Zionist Executive between the years 1927-31. In 1930, he had been an intermediary in obtaining the MacDonald Letter which in effect cancelled the Passfield White Paper.]
From this plan, one might suppose Philby to be an ardent non-Jewish Zionist. In fact, the opposite was the case. After setting out the details of his plan, he wrote, "I have always held and still hold that the Jews have not a shadow of legal or historical right to go to Palestine." He added that he had not failed to realise that both Britain and America had "from the beginning been firmly minded to ride roughshod over all considerations of right and justice in favour of Zionism."(150) Why, therefore, should such a rabid anti--Zionist put forward such a plan. Philby had looked at the situation in a pragmatic way and considered that his plan would be in the Arabs' best interests.
In contrast, however, to this assessment, Nur Masalha in his book entitled "Expulsion of the Palestinians" considers that "Namier's assertion that Philby made the initial proposal of Arab transfer and suggested the sum to be paid to Ibn Saud must be examined critically." He also feels that "the idea of a complete transfer save for a 'Vatican City' in the old city of Jerusalem seems less likely to have come from Philby, a convert to Islam, than from Namier."(151) We should however bear in mind that reading through Masalha's book, we see that his thesis is to show that any proposal for Arab transfer put forward by non-Jews was in fact a result of Zionist lobbying!
Philby worked strenuously on his plan and on 24 September 1939, he had a chance meeting with Namier at the Athenaeum Club in London. Philby there explained that since the war would "interfere with Moslem pilgrimages to Mecca" thus reducing Ibn Saud's income, he would "need more money from outside for armaments." Philby then asked Namier whether since five hundred million pounds was to be raised for Jewish settlement, it would not be possible to use 20 million pounds of it "to buy Palestine."(152)
Philby feared that the difficulty would be "to persuade England and France to grant complete independence to the Arabs and that France should withdraw from Syria." At that time, Syria was under a French Mandate and Philby did not know how to force France to withdraw. Namier, however, had a solution. As a result of the war, the Jewish refugee question would become more acute and greater pressure could be brought to bear on the Western countries to facilitate a solution. The only solution was Palestine, and it could only be given to the Jews on condition that there was a union between Syria and the other Arab countries.(153)
In his book, Philby writes of a meeting with Weizmann and Namier on 28 September, 1939. At this meeting Philby discussed the general tenor of his plan with them and their reactions were "positive and favourable."(154) No other evidence of such a meeting taking place on this date can be found and it is quite possible that Philby confused it with the meeting which took place on 24 September. Weizmann was definitely not present on the 24 September, since at this meeting, Namier had suggested that Philby meet with Weizmann. Philby accepted this proposal and asked that Namier arrange a date for such a meeting.(155)
After his meeting with Namier, Philby met with Arnold Lawrence, brother of T. E. Lawrence ("Lawrence of Arabia") and Arthur Lourie, the Political Secretary of the Jewish Agency in London, in order to explain his plan. Lawrence felt that to request the whole Western Palestine for the Jews, including the wholly Arab areas was "a bit too much", but Philby disagreed with Lawrence on this.(156)
A meeting between Weizmann, Shertok, Namier and Philby took place on 6 October at the Athenaeum Club. Originally it had been planned for the previous day, but had been postponed to enable Shertok (who arrived in London on 6 October) to attend. On the way to this meeting Namier put Shertok in the picture, and informed him of the contents of his meeting with Philby nearly two weeks earlier.(157)
At the meeting of 6 October, Philby's plan was discussed in greater detail. In the first stage, Philby envisaged "the handing over to Saudi Arabia of Syria and various small states on the Red Sea." He did not, however, define what the future relationship should be if Ibn Saud to Transjordan and Iraq, but he suggested that of all the Arab states were to be granted full independence, a proper settlement would be reached.(158)
With regard to the financial side, Philby pointed out that in order to go to Ibn Saud, he must have something concrete. Weizmann replied that "if we receive all of Western Palestine it will be possible to talk about 10 to 20 million pounds." Philby naturally took the higher figure. Weizmann explained that if, while in the United States, he received word that Ibn Saud was prepared to consider such an agreement, he would turn to the President with the suggestion that the American Government assist in financing the scheme which would help solve the refugee problem "by means of the establishment of a Jewish State and the transfer of the Arab population." Philby was enthusiastic over this idea.(159) However, linking the United States with the financing of this scheme was to lead to some embarrassment and unpleasantness.
Namier was less confident than Weizmann of the possibility of obtaining such an amount in cash. He therefore emphasised that such sums would have to be paid in goods. If, for example, Ibn Saud wanted arms, they could be supplied over a period of time from Jewish armament works in Palestine. Shertok suggested that part at least of this twenty million pounds should be used "for development in connection with the transfer of the Palestine Arabs to other Arab countries."(160)
After Shertok and Weizmann had left, Philby asked Namier, whether the Zionists "would be prepared to give bribes to the Mufti and some people in Ibn Saud's entourage so as to prevent a campaign against this proposed settlement." Namier replied that, if necessary, the Zionists would supply the money, provided they were sure that the recipients would do what they promised.(161)
In his book, Philby concluded that at this meeting, his plan received the "cordial approval" of both Weizmann and Shertok, who agreed to use all their influence with the British and American Governments to persuade them to accept and implement the plan.(162)
Shertok commented in his diary that the entire plan seemed to him "unrealistic in the extreme." He added, however, that it contained one important political point, namely the appearance of Philby before Ibn Saud "with the suggestion to deliver all of Western Palestine to the Zionists and to remove the Arabs from it." In order to implement this, Shertok felt that Philby should be allowed to proceed without having obstacles put in his way.(163)
In her biography of Philby, Elizabeth Monroe wrote that during the course of the London Conference held towards the beginning of 1939, Philby "evolved a fresh `Philby plan' for solving Britain's Palestine problem", which he then put to Ben-Gurion and Weizmann at a secret lunch party.(164) Norman Rose, the biographer of Namier understood this to mean that Philby had already put forward his transfer plan in February 1939.(165) This explanation is, however, open to grave doubt since Philby himself said that Weizmann had had knowledge of his transfer plan since September 1939.(166) According to Professor Yehoshua Porath, the "plan" of February 1939, referred to by Monroe, was for the Arabs to agree to the immigration of 50,000 Jews into Palestine in the course of the subsequent five years in exchange for Jewish recognition of Ibn Saud's son Feisal as King of Palestine.(167)
Zionist Efforts
In a report given by Ben-Gurion to the Jewish Agency Executive in Jerusalem in November 1939, Ben-Gurion commented that they had obviously heard about Philby's plan. After summarising the details he informed them that Philby had travelled to Saudi Arabia with his plan. "Our office in London," continued Ben-Gurion, "is now occupied with the preparation of explanatory material with regard to the transfer of population." Ben-Gurion then said that he "did not believe in compulsory transfer, but believed that it was also possible to transfer part of the Arabs from Palestine by agreement."(168) This would seem to be a complete volte-face, since a year and-a-half earlier, Ben-Gurion had stated to the same Executive, "I favour compulsory transfer." However, Porath understood Ben-Gurion's statement of November 1939 to mean that "he did not believe in the possibility of compelling the Arabs of Palestine to leave the country, but he did hold that some of them would agree to do this voluntarily."(169) Thus, Ben-Gurion, according to Porath, was assessing the situation from a practical point of view and was not giving his personal views on transfer. Support for Porath's interpretation of Ben-Gurion's statement comes from an entry made by Ben-Gurion in his diary, a few days earlier. Ben-Gurion felt that compulsory transfer was not possible for the simple reason that the British Government would not implement it. "I don't believe in a compulsory transfer," wrote Ben-Gurion, "not because it could not take place, but because the English will not do it."(170)
Ben-Gurion then pointed out that there was also a group of Englishmen headed by Arnold Lawrence, who opposed Philby's plan. They wanted a federation of Palestine with Syria and Transjordan. The Jewish State under this plan would comprise the area designated under the Peel plan plus the Negev and the el-Jezireh area across the Jordan. Ben-Gurion and Namier had met with this group on 17 November and had explained that they would forgo the el-Jezireh area. In view of the fact that the British would not implement a compulsory transfer, Ben-Gurion felt that it was possible to establish "a Jewish State in the whole of Western Palestine even without transfer - a voluntary transfer would suffice."(171)
A report on the progress of the Philby plan was also given to the Political Committee of Mapai in November 1939. Berl Locker who had returned from London gave details of the plan to this forum. He then reported that in answer to Philby's question whether the Zionists would be able to raise 20 million pounds, Shertok had said "that it would not be easy since 20 million pounds was a vast sum." Weizmann had said that if Philby would get the agreement of Ibn Saud, he would go to Roosevelt and tell him that if you want to solve the Jewish refugee problem in Europe, help us raise a loan for this purpose. Locker also reported on Philby's condition that France give up Syria, and on Arnold Lawrence's opinion that "this programme, and in particular the removal of the Arabs from Palestine to be impossible". Lawrence however, would not interfere but he would also not assist.(172) We thus see that Locker's assessment of Lawrence's negative reaction towards the Philby plan was less severe than the assessment by Ben-Gurion.
Philby's plan was again mentioned in the same forum a few weeks later in a report given by Ben-Gurion on his visit to London. He said that Weizmann's thoughts on a Jewish State in Western Palestine rely mainly on Philby's plan which is just a "curiousity". Ben-Gurion felt it was good that Philby should speak to Ibn Saud, but it could not be considered sound political theory.(173)
As stated earlier, Weizmann and Shertok had promised Philby that they would use their influence with the British and American Governments to gain acceptance and implementation of the plan. Weizmann first turned to Churchill, who at the beginning of the war had been appointed "First Lord of the Admiralty." Weizmann gained access to Churchill via the Conservative member of Parliament, Brendon-Bracken, who was a personal friend and strong supporter of Churchill. Brendon-Bracken reported to Churchill on Weizmann's meeting with Philby in which Weizmann stressed that Palestine could bloom as a Jewish State and that for twenty million pounds, Ibn Saud would offer the Arabs a far better home than they had ever had in Palestine.(174)
On 17 December 1939, Weizmann met with Churchill. From the notes of the interview,(175) we see that Philby's plan was not discussed at this meeting. However, in his book, Philby writes that Weizmann discussed his plan "in general terms" with Churchill at this meeting,(176) but Philby does not give the source of this information.
Philby in Saudi Arabia
At the beginning of January 1940, Philby returned to Saudi Arabia and on the 8th of the month communicated his plan to King Ibn Saud. Philby said that although there had been nothing whatsoever to prevent Ibn Saud from telling him "there and then that it was an impossible and unacceptable proposition", the King had agreed that "some arrangement might be possible in appropriate future circumstances" and had said that he would give him a definite answer at the appropriate time. He warned Philby meanwhile "not (to) breathe a word about the matter to anyone" especially any Arab.(177)
At his meeting with Philby in the previous October, Weizmann had asked that in the event of Ibn Saud's giving his assent and support for the plan, Philby should send word to Namier. Namier in turn would contact Weizmann who by then would be in America.(178) On 6 February 1940, Weizmann in New York sent a one-sentence letter to Philby, "Am interested to know whether you are proceeding further with proposal we discussed."(179) A week later Philby replied by telegram, "Progressing slowly."(180) Philby also wrote to his wife who was in London and she in turn wrote to Namier informing him that her husband's plan had "been accepted in principle and he will think out how it can be worked." She also stressed that it had to be "treated as absolutely confidential" and should anything be leaked out Ibn Saud would "have no hesitation in denying the whole thing."(181)
On 6 February 1940, Weizmann had a meeting at the U.S. State Department with the Secretary of State and Walter Murray. During the course of this meeting, Weizmann reported that he had recently met with Philby in London and the latter had informed him "that he would like to take back with him to Saudi Arabia some basis of settlement which the King might be willing to support." Weizmann had answered Philby "that the only thing the Jews had to offer was money" and if "the price of the King's support of a scheme whereby the Arabs of Palestine would be voluntarily transferred to Trans-Jordan and Iraq" was three to four million pounds, Weizmann would be prepared to raise such a sum. Philby had promised Weizmann that he would convey this offer to the King, but Weizmann "had no means of knowing whether anything would come of it." Weizmann concluded by saying that at that time he was waiting for information from Philby "as to Ibn Saud's reactions to the discussions."(182) It is not clear whether the letter he sent Philby on the day of this meeting was sent before the meeting or as a result of the meeting.
Two days later, Weizmann met with President Roosevelt, but the notes of their conversation show that they did not specifically discuss the Philby plan.(183) Despite this, however, Philby wrote in his book that the two had discussed the plan at their meeting.(184)
On 3 April, Dora Philby wrote to Weizmann pointing out that her husband had written to her stating that "he hadn't had much opportunity to see the king alone to discuss your proposition again."(185)
Two weeks later, Philby wrote a message to his wife to be passed on to Weizmann. Philby pointed out that Ibn Saud "still won't say yes and won't say no. The truth is that he himself is quite favourably inclined towards the proposal and is just thinking out how it can be worked without producing a howl of anger among certain Arab elements." He said that the Saudis were afraid that the Jews would not be able to "perform their part of the contract," but he had assured Ibn Saud that they would be able "to work that through their influence in America" and that Weizmann could "work up the American side of the scheme." Philby apologised that his plan was moving so slowly.(186) In reply Weizmann wrote that since the plan was so important and complex, it was not surprising that it was moving so slowly. He agreed with the suggestion that "some indication should come from America as to the feasibility of the proposal" and said that on his next trip to the States he would try to do something to satisfy Philby on this point.(187)
About this time, Philby reminded the King that the latter had not given him a definite reply to his proposition. Philby reported Ibn Saud as saying that whilst "he was convinced of my genuine desire to help him, he found it very difficult to help me to help him to achieve his ends!"(188) Despite this answer, Philby did not drop his plan, but sounded out some of the King's principal advisers. The first one was Yusuf Yasin, who was hostile to the plan but respected Philby's confidence. Later, he spoke to Bashir Sa'dawi, whose ideas he found "unexpectedly favourable." However, within an hour, Sa'dawi had informed the King of his conversation with Philby and that same afternoon the King rebuked Philby.(189) Years later, Philby was still referring to his conversation on this matter with Sa'dawi as an error on his part.(190)
In May of that year, Philby again pressed the King, but was again kept waiting for an answer.(191) At that time, Weizmann sent a message to Philby asking him for news of progress and assuring him of full confidence in his ability to secure acceptance of the plan. Philby replied that "positive results might still be expected in the event of the materialisation of the initiative envisaged in our original arrangements."(192)
From the summer of 1940 until the spring of 1941, Philby was detained by the British under the defence regulations. The reasons for his detention were not divulged. However, "The New York Times" suggested that the reason for his internment may have been the British Government's desire to prevent Philby "from exposing its present Arab policy, which he says led to the trouble in Iraq, which never would have arisen if his suggestions had been followed."(193) After his release in the spring of 1941, Philby was in frequent touch with Namier and they invariably discussed his plan which Namier and his friends "had by no means given up as hopeless."(194)